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U.S. Software Protection: Problems of
Trade Secret Estoppel under
International and Brazilian
Technology Transfer Regimes
A fundamental tension exists between developing countries and
the United States concerning the protection of technological informa-
tion. The developing countries regard technological information de-
veloped in the industrialized nations as knowledge which should be in
the public domain.' The United States protects the developers of
technological information by giving them extensive intellectual prop-
erty rights.2 Since 1976, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) has been working on a code of conduct for
the international transfer of technology. 3 While the developing coun-
tries known as the Group of 77 initiated the movement at UNCTAD
in order to establish their philosophy internationally,4 specific devel-
oping countries such as Brazil already have domestically regulated the
transfer of technology to increase technological information in the
public domain.5
Despite their intent to promote the acquisition of technology,
these two types of regimes-the UNCTAD international code of con-
duct and domestic regulation such as the Brazilian regulations-may
actually jeopardize international distribution of software originating
in the United States. U.S. software exporters already are showing re-
luctance to send software to countries where they are threatened by
transfer of technology regimes.6 Software ideas are extremely valua-
1. See Patel, nhat the Group of 77 Wanted at UNCTAD and Why, in CURRENT INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL AsPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 124-33 (1980)(S.
Patel was Chief of the Technology Division of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)).
2. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
3. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Code], U.N. Doe.
TD/CODE TOT/I, pts. 1 & 2 (1976).
4. See supra note 1.
5. Normative Act No. 015 (Sept. 11, 1975) pursuant to authority granted by Law No.
5,648 (Dec. 11, 1970), translated in Compilation of Legal Material Dealing with Transfer and
Development of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/81, at 16-48 (1982).
6. At the Tenth Annual Symposium on International Licensing, Technology Transfer
and Distribution, Nov. 16, 1984, sponsored by the World Trade Institute in New York, many
of those attending the panel discussion on "Commercial and Legal Aspects of Software Devel-
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ble,7 and with global computer networks and transborder data flows,
loss of secrecy in one part of the world can rapidly result in the disclo-
sure of highly confidential software ideas back in the United States.
Under the current state of U.S. law, trade secret protection may be
lost merely by distribution of software with a licensing agreement
which authorizes foreign disclosure.
This note describes the fundamental aspects of software protec-
tion and applies the requisites of U.S. trade secret protection to
software. After explaining how the UNCTAD and Brazilian transfer
of technology regimes apply to software licensing arrangements, this
note argues that software distribution under these regimes estops U.S.
trade secret protection by defeating the requisites of secrecy and com-
petitive advantage. Specifically, the effects of the UNCTAD Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology
(UNCTAD Code) and the Brazilian technology transfer regulations
are analyzed to demonstrate the difficulties posed by legal regimes be-
ing considered and already in force in a number of developing coun-
tries. This note concludes with an analysis of some of the possibilities
for protection of trade secrets with international software distribution.
I. SOFTWARE PROTECTION 8
The term "software," often broadly defined, encompasses basi-
cally four elements: the source code, object code, terminal display
and documentation. The most valuable aspect of these software ele-
ments is the underlying ideas from which they were created. The
source code is the tangible expression of the software ideas; it consists
of a series of computer instructions and algorithms written in a pro-
gramming language such as BASIC, FORTRAN or C, and is intelli-
gible to any computer programmer fluent in the language. The object
code is the source code version converted into a language intelligible
only to the computer itself; this is also referred to as machine reada-
ble code. The terminal display is the "external or functional ele-
opment, Distribution and Licensing" indicated that their companies were reluctant to do busi-
ness in Latin America.
7. More than 80% of the software development process is devoted to the underlying
ideas. Remarks by Phillip Dom at the American Foreign Law Association Panel Discussion
on Legal Protection of American Computer Technology in International Trade, New York, at
2 (Nov. 3, 1984)(statement available from the American Foreign Law Association) [hereinafter
cited as Dorn].
8. This note only applies to "industrial purpose" software distributed under a signed
license agreemdnt such as financial analysis packages, and does not apply to software for
recreational or entertainment purposes, as well as relatively inexpensive, mass marketed
programs like LOTUS 1-2-3.
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ments" 9 of the program which appear on the computer screen and
include the interactions between the user and the software. The qual-
ity of the terminal display and user interactions enhance the commer-
cial value of the software and are a reflection of the ideas contained in
the source code. Instructions for the use of the software are contained
in the documentation. The documentation also indicates some of the
underlying -program structure and ideas.
Misappropriation and misuse of the software are easily and fre-
quently effected. The simplest form of software piracy occurs when-
ever an individual makes a direct copy of the software. Since much of
the information is stored on magnetic tape, unauthorized duplication
can take place in a matter of minutes. 10 A more sophisticated misap-
propriation occurs when an individual obtains access to the source
code, terminal display or documentation, and then uses the ideas for a
competing software program. This type of misappropriation is far
less expensive than original software development," and yet is quite
significant since the value of the software depends upon the quality of
the ideas embodied in it. The software industry is estimated to be
worth $19 billion worldwide,12 and misappropriation has software
developers seriously worried. A company making significant invest-
ments in software development wants to have confidence that its in-
vestments are secure and subject to minimal risk of software piracy.
For a U.S. high technology company or individual software de-
veloper, legal protection against these forms of misappropriation re-
mains unsettled both domestically and internationally. In the United
States, a software developer may protect its product by using three
different forms of protection: copyright law, patent law and trade se-
cret law. 3 Each form of protection guards against violation of spe-
9. Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass
Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 262 (1982). This unique terminology aptly describes the im-
portant visual element of software.
10. The object code almost always is stored in a manner that easily enables magnetic tape
copying. This magnetic copying is significant because the object code version is the one capa-
ble of working most efficiently on the computer.
11. For example, the cost of making a duplicate tape copy is several dollars whereas the
cost of developing a standard accounting program for a large corporation is approximately $3
million. See Dorm, supra note 7, at 2.
12. Remarks by Michael Keplinger at the American Foreign Law Association Panel Dis-
cussion on Legal Protection of American Computer Technology in International Trade, New
York (Nov. 3, 1984).
13. See generally Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 4
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611 (1983)(final report prepared for the American Bar Association Computer
Law Division Project entitled "The Legal Means of Protecting the Value of Information in
Modern Computer Systems"); Mantle, Trade Secret and Copyright Protection of Computer
Software, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 669 (1984)(discussion of dual protection through trade secret doc-
trine and copyright statutory scheme); Final Report of the National Commission on New Tech-
19851
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cific types 6f proprietary rights. Copyrights protect the tangible form
or expression of works of authorship 4 and guard only against copying
the tangible expression of the software. 5 Patents protect inventions
and the embodiment of new and useful processes' 6 and are only avail-
able to software that is part of an otherwise patentable process.'
7
Trade secret law protects the underlying ideas' 8 and is widely avail-
able for software meeting certain requirements. 9 Given the limita-
tion that neither copyright nor patent law protects the underlying
ideas embodied in software, only trade secret law gives the software
developer the adequate protection against more sophisticated types of
misappropriation. Trade secret law protects the software developer
by giving it a right to sue the misappropriator for damages and by
giving it a right to injunctive relief when the software ideas have been
misappropriated.2z Overseas, however, only the U.S. company's or
programmer's rights under copyright and patent regimes are gov-
erned by international treaties and foreign law.2'
II. APPLICABILITY OF TRADE SECRET REQUISITES TO SOFTWARE
Since state doctrine governs trade secret law in the United States,
uniformity in definition does not exist.22 The Restatement of Torts,
however, provides a widely-used standard that a trade secret is:
any formula, pattern, devise or compilation of information
which is used in one's business and which gives him an op-
portunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it ....
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret...
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works, July 31, 1978 (1979)(recommending changes in the
federal copyright statute to accommodate software protection)[hereinafter cited as CONTU].
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1982).
15. Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, 687 F.2d 1032, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983).
16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
18. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 22-50.
20. Davidson, supra note 13, at 718; see also R. MILGRAM, TRADE SECRETS § 5.04
(1984)(discussion of available relief from third party use of misappropriated trade secrets).
21. See, e.g., Universal Copyright Convention (as revised at Paris 1971), 25 U.S.T. 1341,
T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. 178, Berne Convention 1886 (as revised at Paris on July 24,
1971), 828 U.N.T.S. 221; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967), 828 U.N.T.S. 107, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 21
U.S.T. 1583.
22. R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at § 7.02[3]; Davidson, supra note 13, at 729. Note also
that federal patent and copyright laws do not preempt state trade secret law since the rights
protected are different under each regime. CONTU, supra note 13, at 18; Davidson, supra
note 13, at 750; Mantle, supra note 13, at 690.
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so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information. An exact definition
of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be consid-
ered . . . are: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of his business; . . . (3) the extent of the
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; (4) the value of the information to him and to his com-
petitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him
in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or dupli-
cated by others.23
In his treatise, Roger Milgram usefully characterizes the key elements
of the Restatement definition as commercial use or value, novelty,
competitive advantage, and secrecy.24
Information classified as a trade secret may be disseminated in
the United States or elsewhere without losing that classification, pro-
vided that confidentiality is preserved through the sale, license, or
lease agreement. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron,25 Chief Justice Burger
wrote that a trade secret continues to qualify for protection when it is
revealed in confidence. Since the recipient of confidential knowledge
often gains it pursuant to a license agreement, the license agreement
defines the conditions under which the information is disclosed. If
confidentiality is lost and the information becomes public knowledge,
then trade secret protection is inapplicable. A license agreement thus
plays a vital role in establishing the necessary confidential relationship
between the software developer and the software user. The license
agreement also helps in establishing that the other requisites for trade
secret protection are satisfied, such as a clause acknowledging infor-
mation which would demonstrate a competitive advantage.
The ideas used to create software represent subject matter which
can be protected by U.S. trade secret law.26 The commercial value
element to trade secrets means that the idea must actually have been
used in trade or business so that the usefulness of the idea is not just
speculative.27 Once the software developer plans the program and
writes a flow chart, the ideas can become valuable. After the software
is created, the license agreement shows that the value is not just spec-
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). While the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1974) omits the section on trade secrets, state courts continue to
use the first Restatement's standards. See R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at § 2.01.
24. R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at app. A1-4-A1-6.
25. 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
26. For a list of cases, see R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at app. A-1, A1-6.
27. See R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at § 2.02.
1985]
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ulative, because the agreement itself evidences the existence of a pro-
ductive use for the software.
The uniqueness of any given software satisfies the novelty re-
quirement for trade secret protection.28  A computer program is
rarely entirely "new" in the sense that it uses a newly-created tech-
nique or language.29 More often than not, programmers adapt similar
codes written in the past to new requirements. 30  This reworking,
however, represents the essence of "new" software. The new combi-
nation of past techniques may result in an unprecedented set of exter-
nal elements (such as input/output interactions, data flow, on-line
assistance)31 or may result in a program which runs more efficiently.
U.S. courts have found that a new combination of algorithms,
processes, or external elements can satisfy the trade secret "novelty"
requirement. In Dickerman Associates v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co.,32
the court found a software menu display 33 to be a trade secret where
"some of the screens are mandated by the needs of the market, [but]
the particular combination of procedures used in plaintiff's system
...are neither obvious nor easily duplicated. ' 34 Other courts have
used the uniqueness theory and approved new combinations of gen-
eral concepts for trade secret protection.35
The competitive advantage element is an alternative to the nov-
elty requirement. There are two approaches to this doctrine: re-
search and development investment or a "headstart" temporal
criteria.36 The software developer's investment of time, effort or
money in creating software which has a competitive edge over other
software fulfills the research and development test of competitive ad-
vantage.37 Since software development is labor intensive, the results
of research and development lose their competitive edge if either the
28. This novelty requirement is not as strict as that required for a patent. R. MILGRAM,
supra note 20, at § 2.08. A patent is not permissible for "novel and useful mathematical for-
mulas." CONTU, supra note 13, at 17.
29. Dor, supra note 7, at 3.
30. Id.
31. For a list of external elements, see Gilbure & Johnston, supra note 9, at 262.
32. 594 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1984).
33. The menu display is the set of choices presented to the user for selection of the func-
tions and tasks to be performed. The number and type of choices, as well as the form of
presentation, are entirely structured by the author of the software.
34. 594 F. Supp. at 35.
35. Cybertek Computer Products v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1024 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1977); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
But caf Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698-700 (Minn.
1982)("Mere variations in general processes known in the field which embody no superior
advances are not protected.").
36. R. MILGRAM, supra note 20, at A1-6.
37. Computer Print Sys. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
(23:679
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results become public information or independent discovery leads
someone else to the same results. A loss of the competitive edge
defeats competitive advantage based on research and development.
The "headstart" theory of competitive advantage grants trade secret
protection based on prior development; in other words, protection is
available for the duration of the "headstart" in development of
software easily developed independently.38 In this instance too, the
labor intensive nature of software development necessitates a loss of
the headstart as soon as the software ideas become public, and a re-
duction in the duration, if not the elimination, of the headstart as the
ideas are otherwise discovered. Any loss or significant reduction of
the headstart defeats the competitive advantage element of the
software.
In all cases, the software developer must maintain secrecy or take
measures to guard the secrecy of the information in order to have
protection.39 Secrecy is especially important where misappropriation
or disclosure cannot be confined to one jurisdiction.' If the software
developer reveals essential details of the software, trade secret protec-
tion is jeopardized. While there can be no effective disclosure of the
object code for trade secret purposes, since the object code is unintel-
ligible to a programmer,41 disclosure of the source code, the external
elements or the documentation would reveal the underlying ideas and
destroy the secrecy requirement of trade secret protection.42 Simi-
larly, if the ideas are independently discovered by a third party, the
secrecy element automatically is defeated.43
Since software creation is labor intensive, secrecy and competi-
38. E.g. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 350 F.2d 134, 142 (9th
Cir. 1965)("the approximate injunction period is that which competitors would require after
public disclosure [of confidential information] to develop a competitive machine"); Analogic
Corp. v. Data Translation, 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (Mass. 1976)("plaintiff is entitled to have its
trade secrets protected at least until others in the trade are likely through legitimate business
procedures to have become aware of these secrets").
39. REsTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); Davidson, supra note 13, at 723; Jostens v. National
Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion,
332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).
40. For example, even if software is disclosed or illegally copied overseas, international
computer networks make it impossible to prevent access to the software from the United
States.
41. Since the object code is unintelligible to a programmer, it cannot be disclosed in the
sense of becoming "widely known." It is, nonetheless, conceivable that making the object code
available would make it subject to disassembly or decompiling and hence directly cause the
source code to become public.
42. For a discussion of ideas embodied in the source code, external elements and docu-
mentation, see supra text following note 8.
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) oF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
1985]
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tive advantage are interrelated. Loss of secrecy for a software idea
eliminates both the competitive edge achieved through research and
development and the headstart of prior development. Yet, competi-
tive advantage is also relinquished at the moment software is revealed
in confidence without restrictions on the use of the software ideas.
Permission for unrestricted use waives the value of a software devel-
oper's research and development as well as his or her headstart.
Notwithstanding the secrecy requirement, the software developer
may make limited public disclosures without defeating trade secret
protection as long as confidentiality and restrictions on use are a con-
dition of such disclosures.44 These measures usually take two forms:
practical methods for preserving secrecy and contractual restraints
imposed on customers receiving copies of the software.4 5 The practi-
cal methods involve mechanisms incorporated directly into the
software, such as special encryptions which prevent unauthorized
copying or use on an unauthorized computer.46 The contractual re-
straints on customers entail license agreements with a series of restric-
tions on copying, use, access and disclosure. 7 Typical contract
provisions forbid the licensee to: make copies of the software (except
for a back-up); use the software on more than one computer; disclose
information about the software except to the licensee's employees or
customers who have signed confidentiality agreements and need to use
the software in the course of their employment or business; transfer
the software; make modifications or adaptations for purposes other
than the licensee's own use in an updated version of the software; and
keep the software upon termination of the agreement.48 Each of these
restrictions acts as proof that the software developer took the requisite
steps to guard the secrecy of the software4 9 and in fact defines the
necessary confidential relationship. The license agreement also en-
ables the software developer to have a breach of contract claim as well
44. Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, 357 A.2d 105, 108, 110-11 (Del.
1975); see Davidson, supra note 13, at 725. The disclosure based on confidentiality might be
either to an employee or to a customer. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475
(1974). The principle applies equally to both, though the basis for the relationship is different
and additional restrictions will apply. With respect to object code, confidentiality restrictions
create an obligation not to attempt to learn or disassemble the software. Davidson, supra note
13, at 726.
45. Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 9, at 225.
46. Id. at 225-26. It should also be noted that no practical method is foolproof.
47. Id. at 225; Davidson, supra note 13, at 724-25.
48. Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 9, at 225; Davidson, supra note 13, at 724-25; see
also Agreement for IBM Licensed Programs (standard form contract available from Interna-
tional Business Machines, Armonk, N.Y.).
49. See supra note 47.
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as a trade secret tort claim." Hence, the license agreements permit a
software company or individual developer to transfer possession of
the software without losing protection of the intellectual property.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER REGIMES
A. UNCTAD International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology
For almost a decade, UNCTAD has sought international guide-
lines for technology transfer transactions. The UNCTAD Code rep-
resents the general trend and philosophy of the developing countries
toward technology transfer and corresponding license agreements.
While the fifth negotiation session in 1983 did not resolve all of the
UNCTAD Code's outstanding issues,5 1 a sixth negotiation session
will be convened during the first quarter of 1985.52
Members of UNCTAD intend the UNCTAD Code to apply to
all technology transfers and not just to those between a supplier from
a developed country and an acquirer from a developing country.5 3
All technology exports from the United States would be affected by
this regime. Although the UNCTAD Code is presently designed to
become a United Nations resolution and not a treaty, unsettled provi-
sions might require a review after four or six years in order to bring
about "universal application as a legally binding instrument. ' 54 Even
without the UNCTAD Code ever having treaty force, U.S. software
exporters might still be bound by its provisions as evidence of custom-
ary international law.5 5 Nonetheless, prior to any possible implemen-
tation as a binding instrument, the UNCTAD Code directs that states
"should take appropriate steps at the national level to meet their com-
mitment to the Code."51 6 Since the Group of 77 countries first pro-
50. Mass marketing and wide distribution of software, however, places the effect of these
confidentiality agreements in some doubt. See Davidson, supra note 13, at 726-27.
51. G.A. Res. 153, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/40 (1983); Roffe, UNCTAD: Transfer
of Technology Code Fifth Session of the U.N. Conference, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 176 (1984).
52. G.A. Res. 153, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/40 (1983).
53. International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology: Recommendations by
the Secretary-General of UNCTAD and the President of the United Nations Conference on an
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology on issues outstanding on the
draft Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/38, at 1 (1983).
54. UNCTAD Code Ch. 8.3, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. E (1983).
55. The texts under consideration for the UNCTAD Code Preamble, paragraphs 11-13,
each support the interpretation that an international norm of conduct has evolved over the last
decade of negotiations. Even the regional group proposal from the industrialized nations de-
scribes the document as setting forth guidelines for the international transfer of technology.
See UNCTAD Code Preamble, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, apps. A & B (1983).
56. UNCTAD Code Ch. 8.1(c), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 19 (1983).
1985]
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posed the UNCTAD Code, it is likely that this group's member states
will continue to adopt similar national legislation. Consequently, the
impact of the UNCTAD code will be felt by U.S. software exporters
at the local level. The UNCTAD Code, in any event, will establish an
"international institutional machinery" to seek compliance and moni-
tor technology transfers.
The UNCTAD Code sets forth rights and obligations for the
software supplier and software acquirer.58 The UNCTAD Code de-
fines transfer of technology as "the transfer of systematic knowledge
for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process or
for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions
involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods."5 9 The definitions
explicitly state that "the provision of know-how and technical exper-
tise in the form of. . .instructions"' also are considered technology
under the UNCTAD Code. This definition of know-how includes
trade secrets61 and software since they are essentially confidential in-
structions. Chapter 5.4 of the UNCTAD Code, which remains unset-
tled, would obligate the acquiring party to maintain "confidentiality
including its scope and duration and the use of any assets like trade
secrets."'62 This obligation would apply to the software recipient, but
Chapter 4 limits the technology or software supplier from including
restrictive practices in the license agreement. Though the list and de-
scription of restrictive business practices is still being revised, the li-
censor may not impose restrictions on research precluding absorption
of the transferred technology in new products, restrictions on adapta-
tions of the imported technology, a requirement of exclusive dealing,
restrictions after expiration of the arrangement, and unlimited or un-
duly long duration of arrangements. 63 The current text leaves the in-
ternational legal effect of prohibiting the enumerated practices at issue
by retaining a choice of language between "shall [and] should refrain"
from the restrictive practices' as well as maintaining disagreement on
the heading for the list of practices. 65 Yet these limitations nonethe-
less circumvent the scope and duration of the confidentiality obliga-
tion. Until the Group of 77 is satisfied with the progress toward
57. UNCTAD Code Ch. 8.2, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 19 (1983).
58. UNCTAD Code Ch. 2.1(x), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 5 (1983).
59. UNCTAD Code Ch. 1.2, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 2 (1983).
60. UNCTAD Code Ch. 1.3(b), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 2 (1983).
61. Blair, Overview of Licensing and Technology Transfer, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 167, at 173 (1983).
62. UNCTAD Code Ch. 5.4(ii), U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. A at 2 (1983).
63. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. A at 2 (1983).
64. UNCTAD Code Ch. 2.1(ix), U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 4 (1983).
65. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 8 (1983).
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completion of the list of restrictive business practices (meaning that
the list adequately limits the scope and duration of any confidentiality
obligation), it will object to the confidentiality clause in the
UNCTAD Code.66
One other dispute under the UNCTAD Code highlights the need
to examine an example of how a foreign country's national regula-
tions affect the software license agreement. The UNCTAD Code's
definition of "international transfer" remains unresolved. While the
code would apply to all transactions crossing national boundaries (in-
cluding transfers between parent and subsidiary companies), there is
disagreement as to whether the code should apply to transactions
within a developing country between companies under foreign con-
trol.67 Software distribution might be made through transactions by a
subsidiary in the foreign country.68 Any form of distribution, of
course, will always be subject to additional national regulations (ex-
port as well as import regulations).6 9 Hence, it is worthwhile to look
at a domestic regulatory regime.
B. Brazilian Transfer of Technology Regime
Brazil is an important example of a developing country with a
technology transfer law. Brazil is estimated to rank "between seventh
and tenth in the world computer market"70 and has recently issued
regulations concerning the importation of software.7' Brazil is also a
leader in the Group of 77, so its actions are watched by fellow devel-
oping nations.72
In Brazil, the government permits access to the computer market
only for those agreeing to the transfer of technology.73 The National
66. See Roffe, supra note 51, at 181.
67. UNCTAD Code Ch. 1.4, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. C (1983).
68. International distribution with a Multinational Corporation is not immune from ap-
plication of these provisions.
69. See, eg., UNCTAD Code Ch. 3, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 6 (1983) (per-
missible state regulations under the UNCTAD Code regime).
70. TIGRE, TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION IN THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUS-
TRY 5 (1983).
71. Normative Act No. 22 (Dec. 7, 1982), 1983 Vade-Mecum Forense 1854, translated in
Daniel, Notes from Brazil, 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK REv. 97, 108-11 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Normative Act No. 22].
72. D. BENDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOFTWARE LICENSING § VIII (1984) (unpublished
manuscript).
73. Castro, The Computer Industry: Restrictions and Performance Requirements, in
HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: PROFILES AND OUTLOOKS OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
55 (published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1983). Brazil has created a "reserved market"
to encourage and to give preferential treatment to the domestic informatics industry. Business
Latin America, Aug. 15, 1984, at 262, col. 1. A bill recently passed by the legislature main-
tains this policy for eight more years. Though the new law makes it harder to qualify for
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Industrial Property Institute (INPI), established as an agency of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, originally was given the author-
ity to regulate technology transfers. 74 Though know-how and trade
secrets were never defined or identified in the statute establishing
INPI, they did receive protection through license agreements to fur-
nish technology. 75 In 1979, however, Brazil established the Special
Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) to regulate the in-flow of computer
technology 76 and in 1982 SEI promulgated Normative Act No. 22
which expressly requires registration of computer programs "made
available to the public in the Brazilian marketplace. ' 77 According to
the regulation, registration is required for all software "intended for
use. . . in Brazilian territory. ' 78 This requires registration for com-
mercial distribution as well as distribution within a multinational cor-
poration. Until 1984, SEI had policy-making authority as well as
administrative control over registration; now policy-making rests with
the National Council of Informatics and Automation (CONIN).7 9 In
addition to registration with SEI, any software transfer agreement
must be recorded with the INPI.8 °
Normative Act No. 22 provides that SEI must approve any
"agreements involving computer programs."81 Among the restrictive
practices forbidden by SEI in the transfer agreements are: restrictions
after expiration of the agreement; restrictions after expiration of in-
dustrial property rights; restrictions on research and development; re-
strictions to the access of new technology; restrictions on use of
personnel; and restrictions on distribution or sales.82 Brazil desires to
make these contractual provisions illegal and claims that unpatented,
permission to import computer products and changes the policy-making apparatus, it does not
change the terms of transfer agreements. Business Latin America, Oct. 10, 1984, at 321, col. 1.
74. See supra note 5.
75. Comment, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software in the United States and Bra-
zil, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 643, 665 (1984).
76. Decree No. 84,067 of Oct. 8, 1979.
77. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 71, at Preamble.
78. Id. at art. 1.
79. Business Latin America, Oct. 10, 1984, at 321, col. 1. Despite the recent shift in
policy-making authority, Normative Act No. 22 is still controlling.
80. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 71, at art. 3. INPI will not record any document
claiming to be a license agreement for trade secrets, though it will record a "transfer" agree-
ment for trade secrets. See Comment, supra note 75 (discussion of various Brazilian require-
ments for registering patent, copyrights and trade secrets under Brazilian law).
81. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 71, at art. 5(b).
82. Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin America: A Decade of Control, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 388, 403 (1981). Restrictions after expiration enable confidentiality requirements to
survive the duration of any license or transfer agreement. Restrictions on access and distribu-
tion are also used to guard the secrecy of the software. Restrictions on research and develop-
ment hinder the independent discovery of the software ideas. Brazil is trying to prevent these
protective measures.
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technological information should become freely available to all
Brazilians as soon as possible.13 Yet these are contractual restrictions
which are always requested by the software-supplying party and are
important for maintaining U.S. trade secret protection. The Norma-
tive Act also stipulates that registration of the software is only valid
for two years.8 4 No provision of the Normative Act discusses the va-
lidity of a transfer agreement beyond the expiration of the two year
registration period. This time limitation increases the risk that the
software will lose all protection, not just U.S. protection, before it be-
comes obsolete.8 5 The Normative Act and SEI registration require-
ments have made many U.S. software exporters reluctant to do
business in Brazil.
IV. EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER REGIMES ON U.S.
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
A. The Estoppel Impact on the Key Elements
Aside from their effect overseas, the UNCTAD Code and the
Brazilian transfer of technology rules estop U.S. trade secret protec-
tion. The impact of the two regimes on license agreements defeats the
applicability of competitive advantage and secrecy to software in the
United States. The trade secret requirements of novelty and commer-
cial value remain unaffected, since these tests relate to software char-
acteristics at the time of misappropriation and not to the distribution
relationship governed by the technology transfer regimes.
1. Competitive Advantage
Under the UNCTAD Code, a U.S. company exporting software
loses any previously existing competitive advantage. UNCTAD Code
Chapter 4 will prohibit license restrictions on research directed to the
absorption of the software in new products8 6 and restrictions on adap-
tations87 of the software. Requiring permission for fair use would
eliminate the value of the software developer's investment by signifi-
cantly reducing the difficulty of independent discovery of the informa-
tion (software ideas) and therefore eliminate the competitive edge
requirement of the research and development test. 8 Similarly, the
required permission for fair use would vitiate any headstart obtained
83. Comment, supra note 75, at 665. This attitude reflects the opinion of other develop-
ing countries. See generally Patel supra note 1.
84. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 71, at art. 6.
85. See generally Comment supra note 75 (discussion of Brazilian protection).
86. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.4, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 9 (1983).
87. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.7, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 9 (1983).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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by prior development and would defeat this theory of competitive ad-
vantage.89 Although the components of software are affected differ-
ently by the fair use requirement of the UNCTAD Code, the U.S.
exporter will suffer loss of competitive advantage for each component.
While it is most unlikely that the source code version of the software
will be exported, if research is permitted on the object code version,
the source code ideas will be ascertained quickly. Likewise, where the
terminal display or external functions of the software can be adapted
easily for use in other circumstances, fair use essentially will give
away an important part of the software's value.
The Brazilian technology transfer regulations cause a similar loss
of competitive advantage. The restrictive practices forbidden in Bra-
zilian technology transfer agreements parallel the UNCTAD Code's
required fair use. By requiring authorization for research on and ac-
cess to transferred technology, Brazil facilitates the independent dis-
covery of the software ideas. This defeats the necessary competitive
edge condition and automatically estops a headstart claim by negating
the value of the headstart at the time of transfer. Also, like the
UNCTAD Code, the Brazilian regime affects the various elements of
software differently. Since Brazil requires that permission be granted
to conduct research on the software, a foreign company cannot effec-
tively preserve the advantage of a major investment in source code
ideas by distributing only the object code; the object code can be deci-
phered very quickly.
The only significant difference between the Brazilian regime and
the UNCTAD Code in their threats to competitive advantage is that
the external functions of the software might be subjected to a smaller
risk under the Brazilian regime. The Brazilian regime requires that
access to the technology not be restricted,90 rather than requiring that
permission be granted for adaptations as found in the UNCTAD
Code.91 Unrestricted access only indirectly threatens the investment
value and the headstart advantage of the external functions of the
software by enabling others to observe the terminal display. Permissi-
ble adaptations directly threaten the worth of the investment and
headstart since development of the external functions is labor inten-
89. If the entire headstart is not lost, then perhaps the competitive advantage should still
exist. If the headstart is not waived implicitly by fair use permission, then certainly it is drasti-
cally compromised since the doctrine protects the trade secret "for the length of time it is
estimated to take someone not having access to the trade secret to recreate the same program."
Davidson, supra note 13, at 720. Fair use would radically shorten if not eliminate that time
lag.
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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sive. The overall result, however, is the same; grants of permission
for research and development and access to the technology waive or
eliminate the competitive advantage of investment and headstart.
2. Secrecy
The UNCTAD proposal would preclude distribution of software
under a license agreement with a sufficiently high level of secrecy to
maintain trade secret protection. As previously discussed, license
provisions restricting disclosures and the permissible uses of the
software are needed to insure adequate secrecy. 92 In Chapter 4, the
UNCTAD Code considers limits on the duration of any license agree-
ment without reference to confidentiality of trade secrets upon termi-
nation of the agreement, 93 and might deny post-termination
restrictions on the licensee.94 An obligation not to disclose software
information must survive the term of the license agreement for the
software developer to guard the secrecy of distributed software, but
the proposed texts of Chapter 4.14 are in effect a "catch-22. ' ' 95 A
continuing obligation of confidentiality is allowed only if the software
ideas are still secret, yet the software ideas cannot remain secret with-
out continuing confidentiality beyond the term of the license agree-
ment. The degree to which non-disclosure may be maintained during
the term of any agreement also is limited by the UNCTAD Code pro-
hibition against restrictions on research and adaptations. 96 By ban-
ning a license clause which restricts attempts at object code
disassembly and limits adaptations, the licensee can readily ascertain
the software ideas and then make them public. These same prohibi-
tions would preclude enforceable covenants against appropriation of
the external elements of the software. In essence, software distribu-
tion under a regime based on the proposed UNCTAD Code would
allow legitimate public disclosure of trade secrets by the technology-
acquiring party.
97
If the disclosure by the technology acquiring party occurs
outside the United States, the U.S. software developer probably will
suffer the same consequences as though the disclosure were made in
92. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
93. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.20, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. D, at 2 (1983).
94. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.14, U.N. Doe. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. D, at 1 (1983).
95. The Group of 77 proposal prohibits "restrictions on the use of the technology after
expiration or termination of the arrangement or after the know-how has lost its secret charac-
ter independently of the acquiring party." UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.14, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE
TOT/41, app. D, at 1 (1983).
96. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.4, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 9 (1983).
97. Even international distribution within a multinational corporation is not immune
from the application of these provisions.
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the United States. The U.S. trade secret doctrine does not appear to
have a geographic limitation to public knowledge.98 Moreover, even
if the knowledge had to be public in the United States before the se-
crecy requirement was defeated, practically speaking, disclosure over-
seas can lead to instantaneous disclosure in the United States through
computer telecommunications.99 Constructive disclosure in the
United States would occur and should satisfy any constructive condi-
tion that the information be public in the United States. Thus, the
UNCTAD Code defeats the required effort to guard the secrecy of the
information.
The Brazilian situation is similar. The duration of any software
transfer agreement probably is limited to two years and restrictions
imposed upon the transfer cannot exceed the term of the agree-
ment.100 Hence, there can be no continuing obligation of non-disclo-
sure and confidentiality, nor effective confidentiality for the lifetime of
the software. 10 1 With mandatory permission for research and access
to the acquired technology, 102 there can be no obligation against dis-
assembly. Secrecy of the software ideas therefore cannot be main-
tained by distributing the object code only. The personnel access
allowed under the Brazilian regime 0 3 also raises the possibility that
an employee may be permitted to divulge the confidential information
without breaching the transfer agreement."° This possibility is an
important aspect if any local arrangement is used since the developer
may not maintain control over the local distributor.105 If the software
ideas were disclosed legitimately in Brazil, a U.S. software exporter
would not have any basis to claim that secrecy was guarded ade-
quately in the United States.'0 6 Since there is effective disclosure in
the United States once the software information becomes public in
Brazil, submission to the Brazilian statutory scheme will estop a claim
that secrecy was guarded107
98. See R=STATE MENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). No geographic re-
strictions are mentioned, and case support is lacking for a geographic test.
99. Once the software idea is exposed and stored on a timesharing computer, access to
the computer and hence the software idea can be effected worldwide.
100. See supra notes 82 & 84 and accompanying text.
101. Industrial purpose software should not become obsolete within two years.
102. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. See generally Davidson, supra note 13 (discussion of employee obligations not to
disclose trade secrets); Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 9 (discussion of employee implied
covenant of non-disclosure). These doctrines, however, govern an employee's obligations in
the United States and do not address the obligations of employees in Brazil.
105. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 99.
107. It is possible to argue that the statutory disclosure should not preclude trade secret
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B. Mitigating the Estoppel of Trade Secret Protection
The acceptance of estoppel of U.S. trade secret protection either
by the UNCTAD Code or the Brazilian regime would have a devas-
tating effect on the progress of technology transfers. The business im-
pact would be felt in either of two ways: the price of the software
would be increased abroad to reflect the loss of the trade secret or the
software would not be distributed in the foreign country.10 8 Each of
these possibilities inhibits socio-economic development for those de-
veloping countries seeking industrialization. As the number of coun-
tries enacting national technology transfer laws grows, 10 9 the stifling
effect on software distribution will increase.
U.S. foreign policy objectives concerning technology transfer do
not help one in attempting to avoid estoppel on policy grounds. The
United States has recognized political, institutional and economic rea-
sons to participate in the regulation of technology transfers to the de-
veloping world.110 While the United States desires equitable and
effective technology transfers, 11 the U.S. commitment is also to a
technology transfer environment that is beneficial for U.S. firms seek-
ing to do business abroad."1 The United States recognizes the need
for an international consensus on technology transfer and recognizes
that compromises are necessary.1 13 Nevertheless, within this frame-
work, a U.S. court's rejection of trade secret estoppel would clash
with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
A mitigating doctrine might be constructed from the emerging
business practice in which software developers who license their prod-
ucts abroad make gentlemen's agreements with their licensees that the
licensees will not assert their full rights under their country's laws.1 14
protection since dual protection is permissable and copyright protection requires public disclo-
sure. See generally Mantle supra note 13. But the copyright law has adopted special tech-
niques to prevent public disclosure of software secrets. See Davidson, supra note 13, at 736-43.
108. See supra note 6.
109. Already Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela have technology transfer
laws. See generally Correa, supra note 82; Control of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of
Technology Transactions: Selected Principal Regulations, Policy Guidelines and Case Law at
the National and Regional Levels, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/72 (1982).
110. See Lehner, What the Developed Countries Want at UNCTAD, in CURRENT INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20, 20-21 (1980)
(G. Lehner was an Attorney Advisor in the Office of the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State).
Ill. Id. at 22.
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 23-24.
114. Remarks by Roger Milgram at the American Foreign Law Association Panel Dis-
cussion on Legal Protection of American Computer Technology in International Trade, New
York (Nov. 3, 1984).
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This practice can work only when the licensee has an on-going rela-
tionship with the licensor. The situation is only a technical estoppel
because the technology transfer code creates rights that if exercised
would estop trade secret protection even though continued secrecy
and competitive advantage in practice would indicate that the
software is still a trade secret. When the estoppel is only technical,
the relative secrecy and competitive advantage which remain are not
functions of the software developer's required efforts to guard the se-
crecy of the information, 15 but rather functions of the licensee's
choice. 116 The legal effect of technical estoppel should not be any dif-
ferent from an actual estoppel which occurs when secrecy and com-
petitive advantage are not maintained. It is distribution under the
UNCTAD or Brazilian technology transfer regime which defeats the
secrecy requirements.
V. PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS TO ESTOPPEL
Given that estoppel of U.S. trade secret protection would have a
devastating effect on world software trade, it is important to find a
solution that will provide adequate protection for internationally dis-
tributed software. An obvious solution would be the adoption of a
treaty specifically protecting software ideas in international trade.
The World Intellectual Property Organization has proposed a Draft
Treaty for the Protection of Computer Software'" 7 which would cir-
cumvent the pitfalls of the technology transfer regimes by establishing
global protection for software ideas. Unfortunately, the treaty faces
such strong opposition that it has been abandoned for the time be-
ing"e8 with little hope of resurrection. Two other approaches might
improve the situation for U.S. software exporters. The first is an at-
tempt by the United States to seek modifications in the UNCTAD
Code and the Brazilian regime; while the second is an attempt by the
United States to enhance domestic protection.
A. The Modification Approach
An alternative to an international treaty specifically for software
protection is to encourage changes in the UNCTAD Code and the
Brazilian regime so that international transfers of software do not pre-
clude the U.S. software exporter from taking measures to guard the
115. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
116. From a practical standpoint, the licensee might be so dependent upon its continuing
relationship with the licensor that it would have little choice in the matter.
117. WIPO, LPCS/II/3 of Feb. 24, 1983, partially reprinted in WIPO: Legal Protection
of Computer Software, 17 J. WORLD TRADE 537, 544 (1983).
118. Id.
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software's secrecy and from having a competitive advantage. Unfor-
tunately, these necessary changes contradict the developing countries'
objective of complete technology acquisition. 19 The likelihood of
successfully modifying either the UNCTAD Code or the Brazilian
regime is therefore small. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine
how the two could be modified in case the developing countries find
that they have completely closed their borders to desired foreign
software.
1. The UNCTAD Code
While provisions in Chapter 4 of the UNCTAD Code invalidate
the competitive advantage requirement for U.S. trade secret protec-
tion, 12 several modifications and accepted interpretations of the tex-
tual language could avoid the issue. The developed nations have
proposed prefacing the description of the prohibited restrictions on
research with the term "unreasonable" 2 ' so that reasonable restric-
tions on research would be permissible. The developed nations have
also requested that reasonable restrictions on adaptations be permit-
ted. 122 UNCTAD has thus far rejected these proposals. If these pro-
posals are accepted, and if restrictions on software use123 are
considered reasonable, then the value of a competitive edge from re-
search and development or the "difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired"1 24 would not be defeated. In addition,
the headstart obtained by the investment expense would not be
foregone.
The addition of a reasonableness standard in Chapter 4 would
also help solve the secrecy problem otherwise created by the
UNCTAD Code. Reasonable restrictions on research and adapta-
tions would strengthen the compromise language for the Chapter 5
confidentiality obligation125 and enable confidentiality to survive ade-
quately the termination of the license agreement. A U.S. software
exporter would thus be able to maintain the required secrecy for the
software ideas and would not suffer loss of trade secret protection
through legitimate public disclosure of those ideas by the software
importer.
119. See generally Patel supra note 1.
120. See supra text accompanying and preceeding notes 86-89.
121. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.4, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 9 (1983).
122. UNCTAD Code Ch. 4.7, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 9 (1983).
123. These restrictions include the obligation not to attempt to decipher the object code
and not to incorporate the external functions of the software into other software.
124. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
125. UNCTAD Code Ch. 5.4(ii), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. A, at 2 (1983).
This text has not yet been accepted by the Group of 77. See generally Correa, supra note 82.
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A further modification of the UNCTAD Code that might help
defeat U.S. trade secret estoppel is the selection of the UNCTAD
president's proposal for the choice of applicable law. This text for
Chapter 9 of the UNCTAD Code would enable the parties to choose
which nation's laws would apply to the contractual relationship. 126
Under the recommended language, the selection of applicable law
may not derogate from inalienable international rights or inalienable
rights under the laws of either the acquiring or supplying country. 127
As long as the ban on the restrictive practices listed in Chapter 4 of
the UNCTAD Code is not considered inalienable, however, the par-
ties to a software transaction could agree to U.S. contract law and
thus preserve trade secret protection. The alternate texts for the
choice of law provision provide that the public policy of either party's
country would be controlling against the choice of law.128 This lan-
guage would preclude a U.S. software exporter from maintaining
trade secret protection since it is the expressed policy of the develop-
ing world to acquire technology without restraints.1 29
It is an unlikely scenario that enough of these modifications will
be accepted at the Sixth Session of the Conference in 1985 to save
U.S. software exporters from losing their U.S. trade secret protection.
The nature of these changes directly addresses a crucial and sensitive
issue in technology transfer, and the developing countries are not
likely to compromise their fundamental desire for placing technologi-
cal information in the public domain after nearly ten years of
UNCTAD debate. As a result, trade secret protection in the United
States for internationally distributed software will remain estopped.
2. The Brazilian Regime
A U.S. software exporter would require modifications to the Bra-
zilian regime similar to those proposed for the UNCTAD Code if the
U.S. trade secret requirement of competitive advantage is to be satis-
fied. Brazil would have to accept restrictions on access to the
software ideas through restrictions on research and development of
the transferred software.1 30 These restrictions are essential so that the
U.S. software exporter does not lose the competitive edge by eliminat-
ing "the difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
quired."1 31 If Brazil accepts these restrictions in software licenses, the
126. UNCTAD Code Ch. 9.1, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/41, app. A, at 3 (1983).
127. Id.
128. Id. at app. F.
129. See Patel supra note 1.
130. See supra note 123.
131. RFSTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
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U.S. software exporter would not lose the investment headstart either.
Brazil must also change its rules that preclude secrecy of
software ideas. The two year duration for software registration is too
short. The contracting parties should have freedom to contract for a
duration based on the expected lifetime of the software. At least five
or ten year contracts should be permissible. In addition, Brazil must
allow for confidentiality of the software ideas beyond the term of the
contract. Again, Brazil will have to permit prohibitions on research
and development that might expose software ideas contained in the
object code. This is a necessary condition for guarding secrecy. Fi-
nally, Brazil needs to allow some restrictions on access to the software
by personnel as another step enabling the U.S. software exporter to
assert that the necessary measures were taken to guard the secrecy of
the software ideas.
Brazil, of course, is unlikely to modify the technology transfer
regime in any of these fashions. The reserved market policy for in-
formatics products 131 shows that Brazil is reluctant to ease the legal
environment for software imports. Currently in Brazil there is a de-
bate over sui generis legislation for domestic software protection.1 33
The Brazilian government proposes to establish an entirely new sys-
tem for software protection and has ignored criticism from other
countries. 134 If anything, Brazil wants foreign software developers to
rely on Brazilian protection for their software distributed in Brazil. 35
B. The U.S. Domestic Approach
Since satisfactory modifications of the UNCTAD Code and the
Brazilian regime are not realistic, U.S. software exporters can only
hope for a domestic solution to their problem. An exception to the
estoppel of trade secret protection faces two major hurdles. First,
trade secret doctrine is governed by state law, 136 so exporters will
have trouble establishing uniform acceptance for any possible excep-
tion. Even given the difficulty of obtaining uniform acceptance, how-
ever, an insurmountable hurdle exists for any legal theory attempting
to preserve trade secret protection through some exception. By defini-
tion, a trade secret cannot be public knowledge, yet the international
rules and Brazilian regulations analyzed in this note operate to place
the software ideas in the public domain. The software exporters
132. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
133. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 694, at 482 (1984).
134. Id.
135. See generally Comment supra note 75 (discussion of existing Brazilian domestic
protection for software).
136. See supra note 22.
19851
HeinOnline  -- 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 699 1984-1985
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
might try to argue that the software ideas entered the public domain
by a form of foreign government expropriation. 137 As such, they
might try to claim that this extraordinary event should not destroy
their domestic software protection. Yet this theory fails because the
software exporters initiated and consented to the publication of their
software ideas; they distributed the software internationally under
these regimes.
A software developer is also unlikely to be able to obtain insur-
ance against the loss of trade secret protection. Since the software
developer voluntarily discloses the trade secrets by distributing the
software under the UNCTAD and Brazilian regimes, no risk of loss is
involved. Given the disclosure of trade secrets whenever software is
distributed internationally, this loss of secrecy is a not an insurable
event.
The U.S. government lacks the capacity to provide a solution,
because it cannot effectively contribute to minimizing the damage
through protectionism. The protectionist policies would have to pre-
vent importation of software131 that use ideas that become public by
operation of a technology transfer regime. While there are existing
federal statutes for relief from injury caused by import competition
under the Trade Act of 1974,139 as amended in 1979, and unfair trade
practices under the 1930 Tariff Act,14these statutes do not apply to
the problem associated with the loss of software trade secrets. The
software imports using disclosed ideas would not meet the injury test
of Section 201 of the Trade Act since the damage would not affect the
entire domestic software industry. 141 The imports would also fail the
unfair methods of competition requirement of the Tariff Act, since
consent to disclosure prevents the use of the software ideas from being
classified as misappropriation and thus as an unfair method of
competition.142
137. The type of expropriation that would be argued would necessarily be a regulatory
taking.
138. Importation of software must also include use of the software on a foreign-based
computer even though accessed from the United States.
139. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982). See generally Sandstrom, Import Relief, Unfair
Trade Practices and the Generalized System of Preferences, 11 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 359
(1979) (discussion of U.S. protectionist legislation).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). See generally Sandstrom supra note 139.
141. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982). The imports would only damage the particular
software exporter whose trade secrets were used. Other domestic competitors in fact would
benefit by the disclosure. In addition, there is an on-going debate as to whether software is
classified as a good or a service. If software is considered a service, it is outside the ambit of 19
U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1). See generally Cavanagh, The Supply of Computer Software-Goods or
Services? 12 AusTR. Bus. L. RFv. 195 (1984)(discussion of software classification).
142. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). This section broadly refers to unfair methods of com-
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Under its commerce clause authority, 143 Congress could propose
a new statute barring the importation of foreign software that
originates in a country whose legal regime precludes U.S. trade secret
protection and that employs software ideas otherwise protected under
U.S. trade secret law. As a practical matter, a statute of this kind
would not significantly help the U.S. software developer since any do-
mestic competitor could still use the new software ideas by obtaining
the information abroad. Any legislative attempt of this sort would
also encounter constitutional objections. The First Amendment free-
dom of speech"4 could be invoked to invalidate any such statute as an
improper restriction on the expression of ideas. Though the Supreme
Court has upheld an import ban on obscene material,1 45 the Court
relied on its previous holding in Roth v. United States1 46 that obscen-
ity was not constitutionally protected.147 In Roth, the Court enunci-
ated the standard that "all the ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance. . . have the full protection of the guar-
antees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests."'' 48 The expression of software ideas are
of significant value for social progress. The interest of safeguarding
the individual software developer upon which these software imports
would encroach is quite small; the ideas are already in the public do-
main and available for use by domestic competitors. Hence, software
should be protected by the First Amendment and an import ban
ought not to withstand a constitutional challenge. Even if the existing
statutes were applicable or a new protectionist statute were constitu-
tional, the remedies would be inadequate for the U.S. software export-
ers. The market for software is worldwide and only the domestic
damage would be reduced for the U.S. software exporters.
One possibility still remains for minimizing the effects of the
technology transfer regimes on U.S. trade secret protection. The U.S.
software exporter can use a license agreement protecting trade secrets
if it includes a choice of law provision that stipulates the governing
law of a particular U.S. state and includes a provision for consent by
the licensee to the jurisdiction of that state's courts.149 If this agree-
petition and includes such methods as U.S. patent infringement overseas. Sealed Air Corp. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
143. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
145. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
146. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
147. Id. at 485.
148. Id. at 484.
149. See generally Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the
Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1977)(analysis of the effectiveness of contractual
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ment is enforceable in U.S. courts, it would preclude the technology
transfer estoppel of U.S. trade secret protection since the licensee
would be bound overseas to the terms of an agreement that ade-
quately guards the secrecy of the software and maintains competitive
advantage.
Given that this agreement might not be valid under foreign law,
the choice of law provision which circumvents the public policy of a
foreign party's home forum would be of suspect enforceability in the
United States. Several states have enacted statutes which mandate
that effect be given to choice of law provisions stipulating the forum
state's law. 150 Otherwise courts have sometimes looked to the public
policy of the forum where the suit is brought to determine whether to
give effect to a choice of foreign law.' 5' In Kewanee Oil v. Bicron,12
the Supreme Court indicated that public policy in the United States
should protect trade secrets to encourage business initiative and com-
petition. 5 3 The encouragement of advances in software technology
necessitates trade secret protection for software ideas. If the court
looks to U.S. public policy, then the choice of law clause should be
upheld as valid, especially since the chosen law is U.S. law and not
foreign law.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts uses a slightly different ap-
proach. In the event that the chosen law is contrary to a fundamental
policy of the forum which has a greater interest in the contract, the
law which governs is the law applicable in the absence of an effective
choice by the parties.' 54 The proposal to choose U.S. law to govern a
software license agreement between a U.S. company and a Brazilian
company would violate the fundamental Brazilian policy of technol-
choice of law provisions); Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
Commercial Agreements, [1982] ILL. L. REv. 133 (discussion of the effectiveness of contrac-
tual choice of forum provisions).
150. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646 (West 1973) (stipulating that a contract is gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance or, if the place of performance is not indicated,
the place of making); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 1-105 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984) (stipu-
lating that effect be given to a choice of law provision if there is a reasonable relation to the
chosen law); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-1401 (Consol. 1984)(stipulating that a choice of New
York law shall be effective for contracts with a value greater than $250,000 regardless of the
relation between the transaction and New York law).
151. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Stidhorn, 658 F.2d 1098, 1100 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1981); American Electric Welding Alloys Sales v. Rodriquez, 480 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir.
1973); Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 307 (1970). But cf Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571 (1953)(court looks to the public policy of the state to which the transaction bears the most
significant relationship).
152. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
153. Id. at 483.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
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ogy transfer.155 In order to determine the greater state interest, the
Restatement refers to the law which would govern in the absence of a
choice of law provision. 156 Governing law is determined by an analy-
sis of the following contacts: place of contracting, place of negotiation
of the contract, place of performance, place of the subject matter of
the contract, and place of the domicile, residence, nationality, incor-
poration and business of the parties.157 While the place of contracting
and negotiation of the software license agreement may be in the
United States, these factors are a weak basis for a substantial relation-
ship to a U.S. forum. 58 Though the software will be used and located
overseas, the place of performance also might be in the United States
if the agreement provides that the foreign licensee must remit royal-
ties to the U.S. licensor in the United States or, better still, that the
U.S. licensor must update the software and render consulting services.
If the relationship is structured so that the contract is negotiated
and signed in the United States and that an aspect of performance in
the United States is coupled with a party's domicile, residence, place
of incorporation or business in the forum of performance, there
should be sufficient contacts to support a choice of that forum's law.
In Nordson v. Plasschaert59 the Eleventh Circuit gave effect to the
parties' choice of law clause despite its violation of the forum's public
policy because the court found that the contract with multinational
contacts transcended political borders so that no state had a materi-
ally greater interest. 6° Any doubts should be resolved in favor of
applying the choice of U.S. law since U.S. public policy considerations
are against the technology transfer regimes16 ' and strongly supportive
of trade secret protection.
Even with a choice of law clause valid under U.S. law, enforce-
ment may be impossible. If the foreign licensee has limited or no
other contacts with the United States and if foreign courts refuse to
give effect to a U.S. judgment based on the choice of law clause, then
the foreign licensee benefits from a breach of the agreement. To in-
sure against the foreign licensee's breach of the agreement overseas
and to protect any future judgments, the U.S. licensor should require
155. There is no way to bring the UNCTAD regime under the RESTATEMENT since it is
not the policy of a foreign forum with a governing law that may have a greater state interest.
156. See supra note 154.
157. Id. at § 188(2).
158. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.7, at 645 (1984).
159. 674 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 1376; see also Barnes Group v. C & C Prods., 716 F.2d 1023, 1030-31 (4th
Cir. 1983) (no effect given to choice of Ohio law when it contticted with the public policy of
Alabama where the contract was performed).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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that an escrow account be established. While the escrow fund could
never equal the value of the trade secret, it may provide adequate
incentive to the foreign licensee to adhere to the contract overseas.
Therefore, a license agreement governed by the laws of a U.S. state
combined with an escrow account from the foreign licensee may be
able to preserve trade secrecy when software is distributed
internationally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trade secret protection under U.S. law, while normally available
for software, cannot be maintained if the software is distributed in
Brazil or in a country which has a technology transfer code similar to
the current UNCTAD proposal. The Brazilian technology transfer
regime does not permit software imports with license agreements that
are adequate to maintain the competitive advantage and secrecy req-
uisites of U.S. trade secret protection. The current UNCTAD propo-
sal presents the same set of problems and causes the same result.
Possible solutions through modifications of the UNCTAD Code and
the Brazilian regime do not seem likely, and a domestic approach to
resolve the issues of a loss of trade secret protection provides only a
minor solution and not a comprehensive resolution of the problem.
Today, it is quite conceivable that any international distribution of
software might jeopardize U.S. trade secret protection depending on
the cloak of secrecy available in the foreign destination. To enable the
use of U.S. software overseas, the best alternative is for a software
exporter to structure the transaction with as many contacts in the
United States as possible and to insert a choice of law clause stipulat-
ing that the law of a particular U.S. state will apply.
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